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2016 SYMPOSIUM ON RECONCILING COMPETITION AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION IN HEALTH CARE
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO SCHOOL OF LAW
September 20, 2016

Keynote Address: How to Succeed in the American
Health Care System
Remarks of Dr. Ezekiel Emanuel*
To be here is an honor. Let me begin with a story, a friend of mine
creates accountable care organizations (“ACOs”) of physicians and puts
primary care doctors together to try to lead them from volume to value—
the basis of all transformation in health care. He has tried to work with
physicians to get them to work together to deliver high-value care. Along
the way, they have done some remarkable things. They have improved
the quality of care for a few of the ACOs. They decreased emergency
room visits, decreased all-cause mortality by 5 percent, reduced acute
hospitalization—but they unfortunately got a 7–13 percent increase in
hospital outpatient facility costs. And that increase in outpatient hospital
facility costs totally bit down on any savings they gained in reducing
emergency room visits, hospitalizations, and readmissions. This is an
incredibly important message for the future because, here, you have
primary care doctors doing the right thing—improving quality of care and
reducing things we know are expensive, like emergency room and
hospital visits. Consolidation is going on all over the country, as you
know—hospitals buy up specialists and buy up other hospitals—and it
can counteract all the work done by ACOs in their pursuit of the right
thing.
Now, I would like to distinguish consolidation from integration, and I
think it is very important to do so and not mistake one for the other.
Consolidation is clearly what a lot of people who are holding on to feefor-service reimbursement would prefer. But unfortunately, this does not
foster innovation.
* Vice Provost, University of Pennsylvania, Department of Medical Ethics and Health Policy.
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So what do we think about integration, and how can we distinguish or
identify places that are integrating? Well, first, are health systems using
data in a performance-driven way? Are they collecting data and giving it
back to their physicians and hospitals to improve performance? I think
that is very important. Second, are they actually taking responsibility for
the continuity of care for primary care, tertiary, and home care? Third, I
think organizations looking to integrate care are first undertaking a series
of transformational changes. They may not undertake all of them
because, after all, if you actually integrate, it is a process and you cannot
do everything all at once. But here are seven different indicators that
need to be looked at when looking to integrate.
The first one is: Are health care organizations transforming their
scheduling to be more patient centric? Are they actually centralizing their
scheduling away from individual practices? Are they using open-access
scheduling? These are strong indicators of transformation and of
attempts to put the patient central and increase value.
Second, as I mentioned, are they using performance measurement and
are they actually providing close to real-time feedback to their doctors to
improve their performance on key quality indicators as well as cost
indicators?
Third, are they introducing standardization across their care, their
physicians, and their health care teams? Standardization is a good
indication of attempts to get costs down and improve quality of care.
Fourth, have they actually integrated care management directly with
the front-line physicians? Not using telephonic care management, but are
they actually outing care managers in the front lines and collocating them
with the doctors and nurses actually taking care of patients?
Fifth, do they use virtual medicine, like this?1 Are they actually
beginning to integrate it into their care?
Sixth, are they actually engaging with the community and trying to use
community health care workers to address the psycho, social, and other
problems of their community?
And finally, how have they changed physician payment? If they are
continuing to pay fee-for-service, it seems somewhat of a contradiction.
Maybe what they are doing is not really integration, but more
consolidation. On the other hand, if they have changed how they are
paying doctors—if they are thinking differently about how to pay
doctors—then they will be changing off the fee-for-service model. Now,
in 2017, we do not know the ideal way to pay physicians to increase their

1. Dr. Emanuel gave this Keynote Address through an electronic video conference call.
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focus on value and to increase their focus on putting patients center, but
we do know that fee-for-service reimbursement only incentivizes doing
more services (e.g., ordering more tests, etc.). And it does seem to me
that part of what we want to see physician practices doing is
experimenting with alternative payment methods (e.g., payment that is
tied to performance on value-based metrics), whether it is improving
quality or saving on the total cost of care.
So, I would say one of the ways that we can look at and distinguish
consolidation versus integration is on whether the heath system has
actually begun these kinds of changes—using data, taking responsibility
for the continuity of care, and implementing these seven other changes
(scheduling, performance measurement that feeds back to doctors,
standardization in their care, having care managers at the front line, using
virtual medicine, having community health care workers engaging to
address the psycho-social conditions of their patients, and paying doctors
and other front line staff differently, not based on a relative value units
(“RVU”) system. I think those have to be assessed when we assess
integration.
The third point is the issue of size. As I go around the country and
look at a variety of places that have integrated and transformed their care,
one of the important things I try to identify is: What is the minimum unit
of doctors needed (or doctors and patients) that really can have the
sufficient scale to transform the care, to actually do the things I
mentioned—change their schedule, get performance measurement, and
have care managers. I have asked a lot of experts—maybe it is 25,000
patients, which would be about fifteen to twenty doctors. I think we are
much more solid and we probably get really to the top end of the curve—
somewhere around 50–100 doctors responsible for about 100,000 patient
lives. I think that gives you a sufficient scale so you can begin to work
on your own data, transform pay, and take sufficient risk. And I think
that element is important.
I think it is also important that at some point you get to a plateau.
Maybe between fifty and 1,500 to 2,000 doctors, you can deliver very
well-integrated care, standardize with good care management, and
adequately engage with the community. Unfortunately, where there are
bad bureaucracies, it is very difficult to coordinate care, and a lot of
problems happen just because the organization is too big rather than
nimble and responsive. And I think the key question is getting people to
the sweet spot of between fifty and probably a maximum 2,000. I think
beyond that, we really have to question whether we are seeing integration
or whether integration is even possible. I think this is an important
empirical question. What I am suggesting to you is anecdotal—I
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recognize anecdotes are not data; I prefer data—but I do think that we
need to see whether beyond somewhere in the 1,500–2,000 range you
actually get what can be called “integration” or whether what you end up
with is just big hulking bureaucracies. As we analyze across the spectrum
in this country, I think we (and the regulators responsible for assessing
this), need to look carefully at consolidation and integration. I would
suggest five important things that we need to push the system on in terms
of policy to move us forward.
First of all, I think when policymakers or antitrust people evaluate
these ever-growing health systems, they need to evaluate and distinguish
between horizontal consolidation and vertical integration or
consolidation. Horizontal consolidation is when one system merges with
another hospital (merges with doctors), and is responsible for the
continuum of care. I am quite suspicious of that, especially as it gets big
and tips over the 2,000-doctor mark. Mainly that kind of consolidation,
or that bringing together of different groups—not to prejudice the issue—
is mostly about leverage and negotiation. And I think that just bringing
doctors and hospitals together is necessary, but insufficient, and I would
be quite suspicious if that is all that is done.
On the other hand, I view vertical consolidation much more favorably,
and I think regulators ought to take a much more favorable look. But this
connection comes with a much greater assumption of financial risk either
in contracts with payors, in contracts with Medicare, or directly. And
again, many groups that look like they are consolidating are taking on
their own financial risk whether they are developing Medicare Advantage
plans, taking financial risk directly from payors and insurers, or
contracting directly with employers. It seems to me that the worry we
have about consolidation on the provider side is much less—and ought to
be much less from a regulatory standpoint—when there is this vertical
integration and these groups are taking a substantial portion of their
payments in a risk-based manner. I think that suggests much more that
they are going to be directed toward efficiency and toward controlling
costs. So, I think when regulators look and assess the size of these
mergers going forward, they really need to look at whether it is horizontal
or vertical consolidation. My own view is if they are taking on a sizable
amount of financial risk and pushing that up, then we should actually look
on that as more favorable and be more willing to let those go forward.
Second, I think, and I have recommended to Washington, one of the
most important things that can happen over the next few years—certainly
for the government and then I would hope for the private payors—is a
move toward site-neutral payments. I think this is one of the great
hitherto unused policy levers that we have to reverse the consolidation in
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the marketplace, certainly to reduce hospitals buying physician practices.
As my initial vignette suggested, part of the reason there is a lot of
consolidation here—not hospital-hospital consolidation, but hospitals
buying physician practices—is really about increasing that hospital
facility fee and increasing the costs that hospitals can get from doctors by
billing them at the hospital rate. Now, we have some tentative moves in
the site-neutral direction. I note just two of them. One is the provision
that Congress passed to prevent any mergers or consolidations after 2017
from having to pay a hospital facility fee.2 I think that is a very positive
move, but obviously lots of consolidations will happen between now and
January 1, 2017, and we need something that looks back retrospectively.
Second, as many of you may have noticed in the new oncologybundled payment model that Medicare released, there has been a move in
the fourth and fifth years toward regional pricing. I think this is a very
good move; although it does not begin to exactly counter the facility fee,
I think it moves away from individual hospital differences and more
toward uniform payment in big places that have premiums that I think
will decrease. I have urged Washington—and I think this is one of the
most important things that we can do over the next few years to really
move toward site-neutral payment for everything—to get rid of the
facility fee, for say, giving chemotherapy in a hospital versus a
physician’s office; get rid of the differential of doing a hip or knee
replacement in a hospital versus doing it in an ambulatory care center;
and, similarly, to discard the facility fee related to doing a colonoscopy
in a hospital versus a physician’s office. If we implement site-neutral
payment, with a one- or two-year glide path into it, I think you would see
a very rapid disgorgement by a lot of hospitals and I think a rapid reversal
of the move toward hospitals buying up physicians. I also think you
would have a different outcome in the story I have just mentioned and a
different outcome in terms of not seeing this big increase in hospital
facility outpatient costs, despite a reduction in the emergency room and
hospitalization. So, I think that is a very important change that should
come about and would make a big difference.
The third policy I would recommend—and one that I have already
hinted at—is moving more toward regional pricing to even out the pricing
across the country; I think this is a very important item. As I mentioned,
Medicare has begun that process with its bundled payment—I would like
it to go a little faster—and I think there are some very important
implications of moving toward regional pricing.
2. Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-74, § 603, 129 Stat. 597, 597–598 (2015)
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)).
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And the last thing I think is important is something that I want to come
back to, which is physician payment and moving toward different kinds
of physician payment. I just think that we need to move off a RVU
system of paying physicians; it is a terribly anachronistic system. And
even health care systems that are taking risks at the system level, but not
moving risk down to the physician or physician-group level, are not
actually doing a good job of transforming.
We, right now, are in the midst of working with a variety of groups to
try to change how they pay doctors. We are working with Hawaii
Medical Service Association (“HMSA”), trying to change their fee-forservice system to a capitated system. Our main suggestion is to keep
physicians whole. Systems should give them, at least initially, a 25
percent bonus for meeting quality metrics based not on 64–66 quality
metrics in the Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set
(“HEDIS”) scorecard, but on a much smaller amount of leading
indicators. And then also incentivize them for keeping the total cost of
care down by sharing about a quarter of the savings from any reduction
in total cost of care with the physicians. I would say first that it is a
process, in part because you have to keep people whole initially and then
you have to slowly move them to a uniform per-member, per-month
capitated model. Second, it is very hard—this is our experience in
Hawaii—to get front-line physicians to understand the difference and to
change their practice from RVU toward more capitated payment. It is
hard to change physicians’ thinking about how they practice and to get
them to understand that the money does not come by just doing things,
but that the money comes from keeping people healthy, and that their big
chance of scoring is by reducing the total cost of care. That is not easy
for doctors to learn and understand, and it is very important that we try
that process and begin changing that process over time. But that has to
come with rewards. And unless we change the hospital facility fees and
that added element, we will get this kind of contradiction—that I think is
unsustainable even in the short time—of doctors doing better, reducing
emergency room visits, reducing unnecessary tests, reducing
hospitalization, and yet, not seeing any savings because the hospital costs
have gone up because of the hospital facility fees and outpatient costs.
And so, I think, all of these changes—site-neutral payment, regional
pricing, trying to assess integration at the hospital-system level, vertical
integration by having them take risk—are all important and they all really
end up feeding each other. They all need to occur together so we can see
some change. I am hopeful, and I will just leave you with the following
thought. We have seen over the last few years a dramatic decline in the
rate of per-capitated payments on Medicaid (that has actually been
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negative), Medicare, and even commercial payment. That decline has
been consistent after the end of the recession, which suggests there is
something else happening inside the health care system to actually keep
costs down. And yet, what is interesting is that if you look, it is hard to
point to any one thing that has been a sort of “big home-run success.”
The ACOs, you can say are at best: “Eh.” Some are succeeding; typically,
the successful ones are serving Medicaid populations or are in low-price
areas. Bundled payments have some successes, but they are just not big
enough to make that big of a difference. So, when you see this dramatic
decline in the growth rate of per-person cost, but you find it hard to
pinpoint something that is really “it,” and you can no longer attribute it
to the recession (that is now six or seven years old), it seems to me that
the decline is a good indication that lots of changes are happening in the
health care system. But we are still not feeling that happen or congeal
into a dramatic change in how we deliver care. But they are out there and
they are haphazard, in a fragmented way, affecting care and keeping costs
under control. That, I think, is a good thing.
So, what I actually think we will identify over the next few years (and
this is my congenital optimism about the health care system) is what has
been driving this control and keeping the cost growth rate down. I do
think it will be an important transformation in the way we deliver care in
some of these larger groups and I do think we will figure out what is
working and what is not working. So, we need better indications for what
to regulate, what not to regulate, and which changes are essential for cost
control.
SELECTED ANSWERS TO SYMPOSIUM ATTENDEES’ QUESTIONS
Pursuant to a question regarding patient incentives, I would say that
patient incentives work on two levels. The first level is high-deductible
plans making people pay a lot before they access their insurance. I think
we clearly see that these plans have some effect. We—meaning the
people working on the Affordable Care Act—tried to mitigate the
negative effects on preventive services and primary care by putting in free
visits and trying to exempt the deductible on preventative care. I think
that was one of the best things we did. It may not have gone far enough,
but it was important in mitigating what we know to be negative effects of
high deductibles on people using prevention and primary care services.
The flip side, or the second place that we are just in the baby steps of
is: How can we use patient incentives to try to actually improve quality
of care and get them to do better things? One of my colleagues at the
University of Pennsylvania, you all will know, is Kevin Volpp, the king
of behavioral economics and using incentives with patients. Kevin,
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myself, and Amol Navathe are trying to combine both physician
incentives and patient incentives to try to get end points that really require
both parties collaborating. So, we are trying now, including in Hawaii as
I mentioned, to not only change how we are paying physicians, but also
to try to bring in patient incentives. For example, with diabetic patients,
we want to give them some financial reward for measuring their
hemoglobin A1C, measuring their glucose, and keeping their hemoglobin
A1C low, so we want to test that combined incentive out. And I think the
short answer is that we just do not know in the second mechanism how
important getting patients engaged in their own health through financial
incentives is going to work. I will say that we do have some pretty good
experience indicating that places that have care managers in the physician
office and really surround the patient are in constant contact with that
patient either weekly or bi-weekly. Those places do seem to achieve
much better quality and much more consistent quality on things like
congestive heart failure, diabetes control, etc., even without patient
financial incentives. Whether they can succeed even better with the
patient financial incentives, again, is an empirical question that can only
be answered by running randomized trials. We are trying to do that. It is
hard, but I think we will learn over the next 3–5 years whether it really
does work.
In response to a question discussing how health care price transparency
could limit price competition among providers, I am not sure why you
think price transparency should limit price competition. But let me
suggest why I think it might at least enhance—not in the Medicare section
because obviously, in Medicare, there would not be a price competition—
the commercial market, if you have site-neutral payments and no added
facility fees and you provided cost information to physicians. It should
make a big difference. But I would say two things about being both in
Medicare and commercial contract. If you are a doctor participating in
Medicare, you get regional pricing and you get site-neutral payments; so,
as a doctor, what is your primary motivation in referral? Your primary
motivations in referral, it seems to me, are twofold: first, the physician
will be concerned with which physicians are delivering high-quality care,
in terms of getting outcomes. And second, a physician will be motived
by who is not using excessive, unnecessary services, and is therefore
decreasing utilization. So, if you take the unit cost out in the Medicare
case, you get an emphasis on quality and an emphasis on utilization. And
these are good things it seems to me. On the commercial side, you still
get price competition between places that have negotiated different
prices, and so you have the incentive to have the low per-unit cost, at least
on the commercial side. And let me say, we have evidence that if you
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give doctors information about the price of services, they actually
respond. And one place where we know that is true appears by looking
at the alternative quality contract model in Massachusetts where they
gave doctors the pricing and the charge where doctors were responsible
for total cost of care. And they began shifting their patients to lower
costing places—initially, to lower cost hospitals, and then to lower cost
labs and other things. And, so, you get both the advantages of focusing
on quality, decreasing utilization, and decreasing cost per-unit of
delivering services. Maybe I am just the wild optimist on that, but I think
here is one of the strengths of multiple payors each doing something
slightly different—where there are advantages to Medicare and
advantages to the commercial side.

